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When the user taps on the recent apps button, this activity will seem legitimate, as seen in Figure 7. When this functionality is triggered, 888 RAT will deploy phishing activity that appears to be coming from the legitimate Facebook app. Compromised devices are controlled directly from the builder GUI. C&CДЁ88 RAT uses a custom IP protocol and port (it doesnвЂ™t have to be standard ports).

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In later versions of the 888 RAT (not the cracked RAT builder), we noticed that the builder was capable of obfuscating strings (command strings, C&C, and other plain text strings) by encrypting them using AES with a hardcoded key however, the package name still remained the same. Because of this, it is easy to identify such samples as 888 RAT.

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The package name of every build of an Android payload is not custom or random it always uses the 8andoserverx package ID. List files from specific directory from /sdcardД¬leanup, remove all /sdcard/DCIM/.dat filesДЄn important factor when identifying 888 RAT is the package name of the payload. Upload specific file from /sdcard/ directory Get names of all photos stored in /sdcard/DCIM/ Get info about whether a specific file exists on device Get Exif information from specific media file Record surrounding audio for the specified timeДelete specific file from /sdcard directory Take photo from camera and upload it to C&C Get list of applications installed on the deviceД¬ompress files in /sdcard/DCIM/.dat/ directory and upload them to C&C Get requested permissions of the specified application Upload Facebook credentials to C&C from /sdcard/DCIM/.fdat Upload binary file to server from /sdcard/DCIM/.dat/Д¬heck whether call recording service is runningДelete file /sdcard/DCIM/.fdat (phished Facebook credentials) Upload file to server from /sdcard/DCIM/.dat/ The builder is also used as the C&C to control all the compromised devices since it uses dynamic DNS to be reached by them. In short, it can steal and delete files from a device, take screenshots, get device location, phish Facebook credentials, get a list of installed apps, steal user photos, take photos, record surrounding audio and phone calls, make calls, steal SMS messages, steal the deviceвЂ™s contact list, send text messages, etc. FunctionalityДЄndroid 888 RAT is capable of executing 42 commands received from its C&C server, as seen in Table 1.

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Cracked version of 888 RAT builderДЁ88 RAT has not been directly identified with any organized campaigns before this is the first time this RAT has been assigned as an indicator of a cyberespionage group.ДЇollowing this discovery, we were able to connect the Android 888 RAT to two more organized campaigns: Spy TikTok Pro described here and a campaign by Kasablanka Group. Altogether, the targeted groups have over 11,000 followers.ДЇigure 6. These profiles are also responsible for sharing espionage apps to Facebook public groups, most of which were supporters of Masoud Barzani, former President of the Kurdistan Region an example can be seen in Figure 1. These accounts, except for one, have not posted any other content besides Android RATs masquerading as legitimate apps. All these profiles were created in 2020 and shortly after creation they started posting these fake apps. Two of the profiles were aimed at tech users while the other four posed as Kurd supporters. We reported these profiles to Facebook and they have all been taken down. We identified six Facebook profiles as part of this BladeHawk campaign, sharing these Android spying apps. Both campaigns were distributed via Facebook, using malware that was built with commercial, automated tools (888 RAT and SpyNote), with all samples of the malware using the same C&C servers. QiAnXin Threat Intelligence Center named the group behind these attacks BladeHawk, which we have adopted. The espionage activity reported here is directly connected to two publicly disclosed cases published in 2020. Both of them used alternative names to refer to the same Android RAT вЂ“ LodaRAT and Gaza007 respectively. The newly discovered Android 888 RAT has been used by the Kasablanka group and by BladeHawk.

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Data from a download site indicates at least 1,481 downloads from URLs promoted in just a few Facebook posts. Some of the profiles deliberately spread additional spying apps to Facebook public groups with pro-Kurd content. These profiles appeared to be providing Android news in Kurdish, and news for the KurdsвЂ™ supporters. This campaign has been active since at least March 2020, distributing (via dedicated Facebook profiles) two Android backdoors known as 888 RAT and SpyNote, disguised as legitimate apps. ESET researchers have investigated a mobile espionage campaign that targets the Kurdish ethnic group and has been active since at least March 2020Д®SET researchers have investigated a targeted mobile espionage campaign against the Kurdish ethnic group.